An outbreak of multi-resistant Serratia marcescens involving 24 patients occurred in a bone marrow transplant and oncology unit, from September 1998 to June 1999, of whom 14 developed serious infection. This is the first such outbreak described in a BMT unit. All isolates demonstrated the same antimicrobial susceptibility pattern and were the same unusual serotype O21:K14. The antimicrobial susceptibility profile showed reduced susceptibility to ciprofloxacin, gentamicin and piperacillin-tazobactam. As the latter two antimicrobials are part of our empiric therapy for febrile neutropenia, they were substituted with meropenem and amikacin during the outbreak. Investigation revealed breaches in infection control practices. Subsequently, the outbreak was contained following implementation of strict infection control measures. A prominent feature of the outbreak was prolonged carriage in some patients. These patients may have acted as reservoirs for cross-infection. This report also indicates that patients who become colonised with Serratia marcescens may subsequently develop invasive infection during neutropenic periods. Bone Marrow Transplantation (2000) sistence of Serratia marcescens in the environment and prolonged patient carriage, factors which undoubtedly contributed to the length of the outbreak. Furthermore, patients who were carriers frequently developed invasive infection during periods of neutropenia.
Serratia marcescens is now well established as a nosocomial pathogen, resulting in considerable morbidity and mortality in susceptible patients. It is associated with a range of infections, such as pneumonia, urinary tract infection, wound infection and bacteraemia. 1 Outbreaks have been described in a variety of clinical settings and different environmental sources have been identified as reservoirs for Serratia marcescens, including disinfectants, 2,3 pressure transducers 4 and bronchoscopes, 5 amongst others. In addition, Serratia marcescens often demonstrates multiple antibiotic resistance, [6] [7] [8] necessitating the use of antibiotics usually kept in reserve. We describe an outbreak of Serratia marcescens in a haematology/oncology unit involving 24 patients. The outbreak was characterised by long-term per-sistence of Serratia marcescens in the environment and prolonged patient carriage, factors which undoubtedly contributed to the length of the outbreak. Furthermore, patients who were carriers frequently developed invasive infection during periods of neutropenia.
Materials and methods

Patient data
From September 1998 to June 1999, we observed an outbreak of Serratia marcescens involving 24 patients, in a 31-bed haematology-oncology unit, which incorporates the National Bone Marrow Transplant unit. The unit has four six-bedded wards, three single rooms and four HEPAfiltered BMT rooms. Fifteen patients were haematology patients, six of whom were receiving cytotoxic chemotherapy, eight were post BMT and one patient, the index case, was on cytotoxic chemotherapy during his first two episodes of sepsis and in the early post-BMT phase for his third. Nine patients were oncology patients, all of whom were receiving cytotoxic chemotherapy for their underlying disease. An infected case was defined as a patient with symptoms and/or signs of infection and Serratia marcescens was cultured from an infected site. A colonised case was defined as a patient in whom Serratia marcescens was cultured in the absence of symptoms and/or signs of infection. The number of new cases per month is shown in Figure 1 . 
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Infection control
In November 1998, it became apparent that an outbreak was occurring and infection control measures were reviewed. Patients known to be infected or colonised were isolated in single rooms, where possible. All staff were educated about modes of transmission of Serratia marcescens and staff were re-trained in hand-washing using Glo-Germ (Glo-Germ Product Co, Moat, UT, USA). Briefly, the procedure is as follows: fluorescent dye is rubbed on to the hands, which are then washed and placed under a fluorescent lamp. Failure to remove the dye following handwashing is easily observed. A thorough investigation of ward procedures was undertaken, including extensive environmental screening. A variety of sites were sampled, including bathrooms, the sluice room, commodes, urine jugs, the bedpan washer, disinfectants, mouthwash, icemaker, total parenteral nutrition infusates, intravenous pumps and a BMT bed post cleaning and disinfection. In all cases moistened swabs were used and these were transported to the laboratory using sterile Trans tubes, containing transport media (Medical Wire and Equipment Co Ltd, Corsham, UK). Environmental screening was repeated in January 1999. A total of 159 environmental samples were processed. In January, 12 staff members, during their working day, were randomly screened for hand carriage of Serratia marcescens, using finger agar plates.
Bacterial isolates and identification
A total of 109 isolates of Serratia marcescens were collected from 23 of the patients involved in the outbreak. A further patient was also thought to be involved in the outbreak, but unfortunately isolates were not available for study. The organisms were isolated from different clinical sites including blood, intravenous catheter tips, urine, faeces, sputum, wound swabs, throat and skin. Two Serratia marcescens isolates were recovered from environmental sampling.
Isolates were identified using the API 20E (BioMérieux, Montalieu Vercieu, France) system. Arabinose and raffinose peptone broth sugar fermentation were also used to confirm identification.
Susceptibility testing
Susceptibility testing was performed on all isolates using a modified Stokes disc diffusion method on diagnostic sensitivity test agar (Oxoid Ltd, Basingstoke, UK), with Escherichia coli NCTC 10418, as the control. The antimicrobials used were ampicillin (10 g), amoxicillin (20 g)-clavulanic acid (10 g), cefuroxime (30 g), cefotaxime (30 g), ceftazidime (30 g), piperacillin (75 g)-tazobactam (10 g), ciprofloxacin (1 g), gentamicin (10 g), tobramycin (10 g) amikacin (30 g) and meropenem (10 g).
The minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC) for cefotaxime, ceftazidime, pipercillin/tazobactam, gentamicin and ciprofloxacin were determined by the E test (AB Biodisk, Sweden), on one representative isolate from each patient and both environmental isolates. Escherichia coli NCTC 10418 and Pseudomonas aeruginosa NCTC 10662 were tested in conjunction.
Epidemiological typing
O and K serotypes were determined by the Laboratory of Hospital Infection, Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), Colindale, UK, on one isolate from each of 23 patients and on the two environmental isolates.
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Results
Twenty-four patients were involved in the outbreak, with the highest number of new cases arising in November, December and January ( Table 1 ). The male/female ratio was 13/11, with a median age of 41.5 years (range 20-70). Ten patients were colonised with Serratia marcescens, which was isolated from such sites as throats, wounds, sputum and urine in mixed culture. Fourteen patients had 17 episodes of clinically significant infection and required therapy with antibiotics. There were nine episodes of septicaemia, one maxillary sinusitis and pneumonia and seven urinary tract infections (Table 1) . No death was directly attributable to infection with Serratia marcescens.
In the colonised group, only one of 10 patients was neutropenic (neutrophil count Ͻ0.5 × 10 9 /l) at the time of initial isolation of Serratia marcescens. However, nine patients were neutropenic during 17 episodes of clinical infection. Importantly, seven of nine of these neutropenic patients who developed infection, were previously known to be colonised with Serratia marcescens (Figure 2 ). Eight patients were not neutropenic when they developed invasive infection, but only one patient was known to be colonised with Serratia marcescens.
Not all patients in the unit were screened for Serratia marcescens colonisation. However, Serratia marcescens was screened for in all clinical samples and also in faecal specimens after the outbreak was apparent. Persistence in the routine clinical specimens was a prominent feature. Overall, the average length of carriage was 7 weeks. In the colonised group, the average length of carriage was 2.6 weeks. In the infected group, the average length of carriage was 10.1 weeks, lasting 32 weeks in one patient.
Infection control
Serratia marcescens was isolated from the control buttons of an intravenous infusion pump in November 1998 and in January 1999, Serratia marcescens was isolated from a urine jug assigned to a patient without evidence of Serratia marcescens carriage. All other environmental screens were negative for Serratia marcescens, as was staff hand screening. However, Staphylococcus epidermidis and Acinetobacter species were isolated from a bone marrow transplant bed after cleaning and disinfection and the hands of three of 12 staff members were positive for the following noncommensal organisms: Staphylococcus aureus, Acinetobacter species, Flavobacterium species and Chryseomonas species. In addition, the Glo-Germ procedure indicated inadequate hand washing by some staff members.
Investigation of ward procedures highlighted a number of breaches in infection control practice. There was no cleaner's storage room built in the original design of the ward. This led to poor cleaning practices in the unit, such as the inappropriate storage of cleaning agents and cloths in the sluice room and the stacking of urine jugs without adequate drying. In addition, attendant staffing levels were sub-optimal. When these control of infection breaches were rectified, only one new case occurred after March 1999.
Susceptibility testing and epidemiological typing
All Serratia marcescens isolates tested from both patient and environmental sources, demonstrated the same susceptibility pattern and MIC values. The isolates showed resistance to ampicillin, amoxycillin-clavulanic acid and cefuroxime and reduced susceptibility to cefotaxime (MIC 8.0 g/ml), pipercillin-tazobactam (MIC 8.0 g/ml), gentamicin (MIC 16 g/ml) and ciprofloxacin (MIC 1.0 g/ml).
Isolates remained susceptible to ceftazidime (MIC 0.5 g/ml), amikacin, tobramycin and meropenem. Epidemiological typing revealed that all representative isolates
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Discussion
There have been many recent publications describing hospital outbreaks of Serratia marcescens. 2, 3, 6, 10 This is the first reported outbreak in a BMT and oncology unit. A feature of the outbreak was prolonged patient carriage, which frequently led to invasive infection during neutropenic episodes. Investigation of the outbreak indicated that lapses in infection control policies had occurred and environmental contamination was also evident.
Prolonged carriage was most notable in those patients who developed infection with Serratia marcescens (Table  3) . However, there are few studies in the literature recording patient carriage. A report in 1976 showed persistence of Serratia marcescens for more than 3 months in 12 of 128 patients with clinically significant infection.
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Another report in 1998 showed persistence of Serratia marcescens in the respiratory secretions of a patient 1 year after initial isolation. 10 It is significant that nine of 17 episodes of infection, as opposed to one of 10 episodes of colonisation, were associated with neutropenia. In the group which developed clinical infection, patients who were not neutropenic usually developed infection concurrently with their initial isolation of Serratia marcescens, ie exogenous infection in seven of eight patients. In the group of patients who were neutropenic and developed clinical infection, patients were far more likely to have acquired Serratia marcescens prior to the development of infection, ie endogenous infection in seven of nine patients. This emphasises the role of neutropenia in predisposition to infection.
Similar to many other reports, we did not identify any environmental source for the outbreak. The environmental isolates found were probably due to contamination. The role of contamination of the hospital environment and inadequate ward cleaning in the spread of nosocomial infection remains controversial. A previous study suggested a role for a heavily contaminated environment in the spread of Serratia marcescens, 12 but this remains unproven. Many outbreaks of Serratia marcescens have implicated hand transmission in the spread of this organism. 11, 13, 14 Despite our negative results, we also believe that hand transmission played a major role in the spread of Serratia marcescens, as highlighted by contamination of the control buttons of an intravenous pump, the inadequate hand washing and noncommensal flora on three of 12 staff hands screened. We believe that a combination of a prolonged patient reservoir, sub-optimal cleaning practices and hand transmission were important factors in the outbreak.
The Serratia marcescens isolates involved in this outbreak demonstrated reduced susceptibility to the antimicrobials most frequently used as first-line therapy in the unit, ie pipercillin-tazobactam, gentamicin and ciprofloxacin. As Serratia marcescens characteristically produces class 1 chromosomal ␤-lactamase, this precluded the use of cephalosporins, 15 further limiting the range of antibiotics which could be used. This had important therapeutic implications, necessitating the use of meropenem and amikacin as first-line therapy, during the outbreak. Although grampositive bacteria have now become the dominant cause of infection in neutropenic patients in most haematology/ oncology units, 16 this outbreak demonstrates that gramnegative bacteria can still cause severe, life-threatening infection and pose serious problems in the enforcement of infection control practices.
